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COMMENTARY: THE DRAGON IN THE CAVE'
Gary Mindat
INTRODUCTION
We celebrate Holmes and The Path of the Law because we
are still living in the "Century of Holmes." Yet, as the papers
by Professors G. Edward White, Thomas C. Grey and Cather-
ine Pierce Wells suggest, there is much about Holmes that we
still do not understand. We are still trying to figure out why
Holmes is such an important figure in the development of
American law. We are still trying to make sense of the cryptic
nature of Holmes's legal theory. We are still struggling to ap-
preciate the significance of Holmes's role in the development of
American jurisprudence.
Professors White, Grey and Wells offer different interpre-
tations about the following: (1) Holmes's dissent in Lochner v.
New York;' (2) the contradictory nature of his essay, The Path
of the Law;2 and (3) the meaning to be attributed to the cyni-
cal nature of general Holmesian thought. While the substan-
tive focus of each of these papers is different, all three attempt
to shed new light on Holmes. The combined effort of these
papers, however, ultimately fails to clarify the many mysteries
surrounding Holmes and his ideas. Indeed, after considering
what Professors White, Grey and Wells have to say about
Holmes, we are left pondering a new set of perplexing puzzles.
First, there is the problem of assessing Holmes's populari-
ty and the meaning to be attributed to his famous dissent in
Lochner v. New York.3 Is the orthodox wisdom about Holmes's
dissent correct in portraying Holmes as an enemy of substan-
tive due process? Was Holmes a modernist hero who helped to
©1997 Gary Minda. All Rights Reserved.
William J. Mairer, Jr., Visiting Professor of Law, West Virginia University
College of Law; Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
'Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74.
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push us into the twentieth century, or was Holmes a troubled
modernist thinker who was still caught up in the nineteenth
century jurisprudence of his day? What explains the popularity
of Holmes's Lochner dissent in the progressive era, and why
did it take so long for Holmes to be lionized?
Holmes is now, as Professor White has argued, a profes-
sional and cultural icon in the history of American legal
thought. His humanity was turned into marble long ago as
judicial biographers and legal theorists idolized and mystified
the man. In the paper he presented today, Professor White is
chiseling and hacking at Holmes's dissent in Lochner in his
most recent effort to rediscover the "real Holmes" underneath
all the marble erected by those who put Holmes on a pedestal.
In getting us to the real Oliver Wendell Holmes underneath all
the marble, Professor White hopes to recover the way Holmes
and his contemporaries on the Supreme Court actually thought
about the constitutional issues in Lochner.
The standard story about what the Court did in Lochner is
as follows: In Lochner, the Court struck down the New York
law restricting the number of hours bakers could work because
the Court mistakenly assumed that the constitutional concept
of "liberty" was a prepolitical, universal concept, shaped by the
laws of the political economy. New York's maximum hours
legislation was found to violate the Due Process Clause be-
cause it was contrary to the universal laws of a laissez faire
market. The standard story about Holmes's dissent in Lochner
is that he exposed how the concept of liberty embraced a con-
servative, laissez faire ideology that was blocking the much
needed state regulation of the economy.
Commentators casted the Lochner majority as nineteenth
century Langdellians who believed in obsolete natural law;
Holmes was cast as a modernist hero advancing the twentieth
century case for big government and the modern regulatory
state. Professor White's intellectual project is to expose how
these perceptions deviate from what Holmes and his contempo-
raries actually thought, and how they were created in the
1930s by liberal progressives, like Felix Frankfurter, in order
to undermine substantive due process.
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Professor White also hopes to tame a canonization process
which he says has distorted our historical understanding of
Holmes and his famous Lochner dissent. To do this, White
must reinterpret the meaning of the icon that has become
Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Professional and cultural icons, however, are not easily
interpreted because they are similar to a religious text. To
interpret the meaning of the text, one must interpret the
meaning of a particular interpretive culture and tradition. For
Professor White, the culture responsible for the lionization of
Holmes's Lochner dissent was the progressive era, and the
religion was a new epistemology, or theory of knowledge, now
known as modernism in law.4 According to Professor White,
the epistemological assumptions of Holmes's interpretive com-
munity provide clues for reexamining the standard story about
Lochner.
White first claims that Holmes's popularity must be
reexplained in the light of an epistemological shift in constitu-
tional jurisprudence that took place in the 1930s. This shift
supposedly enabled legal progressives like Felix Frankfurter to
lionize Holmes as a great champion of progressive legislation.
According to Professor White, legal progressives found within
Holmes's Lochner dissent the inspiration for replacing an epis-
temology that assumed there was nothing one can do about the
economy (laissez faire), with a new epistemology that accepted
the view that human beings have the power to control their
economic destiny. Professor White argues that the lionization
of Holmes was successful in making him a champion of pro-
gressive causes because, by mid-century, legal progressives
were pushing American jurisprudence towards this new episte-
mology, an epistemology White identifies with modernism in
law.
Professor White's thesis is that when Holmes's Lochner
dissent is read in light of his interpretive community, however,
Holmes should be understood as merely a "transitional figure"
in the passage from a premodernist to modernist jurispru-
' For my interpretation of modernism in law, see GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN
LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURYS END 5-6, 13-80 (1995)
[hereinafter INvDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL IOVELETS]; Gary Minda, One Hundred
Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag,
28 IND. L. REV. 353 (1995) [hereinafter Minda, One Hundred Years].
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dence. According to White, Holmes was a legal modernist to
the extent that he accepted the importance of human will and
human agency in the development of law, but Holmes's mod-
ernism was tempered by premodernist assumptions about the
capacity of government to regulate the economy.5 White at-
tempts to show how Holmes's "premodern" sensibilities were in
fact influenced by a nineteenth century political philosophy
which accepted the notion that the economy was constrained
by external "forces."'
Following White's suggestion, I think one would find that
Holmes's premodernist sensibilities were consistent with the
laissez faire philosophy of the Lochner majority: economic regu-
lation was unwise because it interfered with the external laws
of a laissez faire market economy. Why, then, did Holmes's
"premodernist" cast to jurisprudence not lead him to side with
the majority in Lochner and strike down the maximum hours
legislation?
Professor White's answer is that by 1905, Holmes's skepti-
cism of the powers of legal reasoning had combined with the
principle of legislative supremacy and the belief in
majoritarian will. Holmes's skepticism isolated him from the
progressives, but Holmes's belief in legislative supremacy
worked in favor of the progressive attack on substantive due
process. Professor White thus argues that Holmes dissented in
Lochner because he believed in the principle of legislative su-
premacy. Nonetheless, as Professor White says, Holmes never
, E.g., G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes's
Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 91 n.7 (1997) [hereinafter White, Revisit.
ing]. See also G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Episte-
mology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 576, 579 n.11 (1995). White
argues that modernists believed in the power of human reason and human will to
control the universe, and that premodernists were united by external constraints.
' This view is similar to the view in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Abrams, Holmes stated that "the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market . . . . " Id. Hence, Holmes seems to embrace the premodern idea of
truth-the "truth" of some idea can be determined by an external process regulat-
ed by the laws of marketplace competition.
On the other hand, Holmes's ideas about legislative supremacy or the truth
process may be merely a reflection of Holmes's refusal to decide difficult social
issues himself.
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favored maximum hours regulation as such because he was
skeptical about the ability of government to alter the forces of
market competition.
If Holmes had reservations about the deductive powers of
law and government, why would he think that the principle of
legislative supremacy would enable him to deduce the correct
result in a case like Lochner? Holmes's skepticism about legal
reasoning and his views about the "fallacy of logic" surely must
have carried over to his thoughts about the principle of legisla-
tive supremacy. Even if he had faith in legislative supremacy,
that principle did not have to lead him to dissent in Lochner.
As Professor Grey once explained, "one might accept [the prin-
ciple of legislative supremacy] and yet strike down the maxi-
mum hours law, characterizing liberty of contract not as part
of a controversial and historically transient -economic theory
but rather as a fundamental aspect of personal liberty."7
This is not to say that Holmes did not have reasons for
abstaining from deciding the constitutional issue raised in
Lochner. Holmes's position on the principle of legislative su-
premacy may have been merely another example of his general
refusal to decide difficult social issues.' Perhaps Holmes sim-
ply did not want to decide the issue in Lochner because he was
more comfortable deferring to the opinions of others. Thus, I do
not think we can say with any certainty that Holmes was wed-
ded to a nineteenth century theory of laissez faire.
By the time Lochner was decided, Holmes had abandoned
attempting to decide the underlying social policy questions at
issue in cases like Lochner. By 1905, Holmes had given up on
his search for the imminent rationality in law and embraced
the mantle of judicial self-restraint. As Morton Horwitz stated:
Judicial restraint follows from the collapse of [Holmes's] search for
imminent rationality in customary law. If law is merely politics,
then the legislature should in fact decide. If law is merely a battle
Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 820
(1989).
' Holmes frequently reached decisions by deferring to someone elsA's point of
view. See, e.g., Catharine Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within The Wider Intel-
lectual Tradition: The Pragmatism Of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L.
REv. 541, 590-92 (1988).
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ground over which social interests clash, then the legislature is the
appropriate institution for weighing and measuring competing inter-
ests.9
Horwitz's view places Holmes squarely in the progressive
camp, along with Felix Frankfurter. I wonder, then, whether
Professor White's effort to distance Holmes from Frankfurter is
correct.
There are also some perplexing questions raised by the
way Professor White frames his project. In the introduction of
his paper, he states that "[Holmes's] particular consciousness
made him read police power cases in a quite different fashion
from his fellow jurists and commentators."" Moreover, he an-
nounces that "[his paper will] proceed to trace the implications
of this epistemological divide between Holmes and most other
judges of his time.""
What follows are questions I raise about how Professor
White has framed the theoretical issues of his paper: Why
does Professor White say that Holmes had a "particular con-
sciousness," and why does he believe that this made Holmes
read the police power cases in a particular way? Is judicial
interpretation in constitutional adjudication the product of a
particular consciousness? Can we reconstruct the historical
consciousness of a particular judge by deducing it from the
judge's epistemology or theory of knowledge? Do modernist
and premodernist epistemologies determine how judges inter-
pret the law and cast their votes in cases like Lochner? And,
what kind of epistemology would frame the analysis in this
way?
Surely, something more than just epistemology is at work
in constitutional adjudication. At the outset, I would raise the
possibility that interpretation is not epistemology. If we want
to interpret the historical meaning of judicial opinions we
should think more about how legal interpretation operates in
constitutional adjudication.
9 MORTON J. HORwITZ, THE TRANSFOPIATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960, at
142 (1992).
10 White, Revisiting, supra note 5, at 90-91.
. White, Revisiting, supra note 5, at 91.
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We need to interrogate the authority of the epistemological
assumptions that frame Professor White's historical inquiry.
As Stanley Fish suggested, we should consider how historical
and legal interpretations, like all interpretations, are conven-
tional, in the sense that they are the product of particular in-
terpretive assumptions of a particular interpretive communi-
ty.' To do this, we need to investigate how different interpre-
tive assumptions frame the scholarly inquiry as applied to both
the person doing the analysis as well as the person who is the
object of that analysis.
Additionally, I wonder whether Professor White's
epistemological categories of premodernism and modernism
can really be distinguished from one another.'3 I think that
modernism in law should be thought of as a reaction to the
tension posed by the two epistemologies categorized by Profes-
sor White.'4 Thus, I argue that what Professor White calls
premodern and modern epistemologies are really two different
sides of the same coin-they reflect the different sides of mod-
ernism in law. One side is committed to the view that there
are external constraints on policymaking-law is discovered,
not made. The other side is committed to the contrary view
that law is a social construction, and hence policymaking is
unrestrained. The two sides contradict each other, and that is
what creates the tensions within modernism in law.
When woven together, these two sides of modernism help
explain the intellectual mood of modern legal scholars who
believe in the authority of the rule of law but accept the les-
sons of legal realism that law is made, not discovered. The
"See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASs?. 269-72 (1980).
"In an important footnote, Professor White contends that Holmes was a mod-
ernist to the extent that he affirmed the primacy of human-centered causation.
White, Revisiting, supra note 5, at 91 n.7. White argues, however, that Holmes
also embraced a premodernist epistemology that accepted the idea that there were
external constraints on policymaking. White, Revisiting, supra note 5, at 91 n.7.
As White puts it.
Although Holmes denied the intelligibility of essentialist external princi-
ples in law, he acted as if such principles retained an intelligibility in
other realms. Hence he could launch a critique of the judicial doctrine of
"liberty of contract" without endorsing the efficacy of initiates in 'social
legislation."
White, Revisiting, supra note 5, at 91 n.7.
1 See MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVELIENT, supra note 4, at 13-22. See
also Minda, One Hundred Years, supra note 4, at 357-67.
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history of modern legal thought can then be told as a story of a
series of failed attempts to reconcile and synthesize this ten-
sion. What makes Holmes /a modernist is that he, like
Langdell, believed that the faculties of the mind or the forces
of faith would enable human beings to someday resolve the
confficting aspects of modern law. I thus read Professor White
as discovering within Holmes's legal thought the contradictions
of legal modernism.
Finally, I wonder whether Professor White's epistemology
thesis explains what is really going on in the canonization of
Holmes. As Professor White observed, the canonization of
Holmes in the progressive era was stimulated by political op-
position to the canon that had been created by substantive due
process. Professor White argues that Holmes became a canon
in the progressive era so that progressives could kill or tame
the substantive due process canon. I do not think we can ex-
plain why one canon wins over another merely by looking to
the theory of knowledge or epistemology. On this point, politics
and culture must also play a role.
As noted by Professor White, the legend of Holmes has so
waxed and waned in the last one hundred years that it is quite
difficult to understand what is pulling and pushing this legend
-particularly because we are still in the process of discovering
amazing new details about this man. After all, it was only a
few short years ago that we discovered that Holmes had an
affair during his long marriage to Fanny. Indeed, with what
judicial biographers are now saying about Holmes, one won-
ders whether Holmes is on his way to becoming a new kind of
romantic hero or antihero. This is not based on shifts in epis-
temology, but rather on new speculation about his extramarital
affairs and his sexuality. Consider, for example, the startling
new revelations of Sheldon Novick's recent book on Henry
James, suggesting that Holmes and James were lovers.15
Could it be that Holmes is on his way to becoming a new
cultural icon for the gay and lesbian communities? Stranger
things have happened in the current postmodern era. Consider,
for example, what the new historians have said about one of
5 See Michiko Kakutani, Rummaging in the Mind of a Genius Growing Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1996, at B4 (reviewing SHELDON M. NOVICK, HENRY JAMEs:
THE YOUNG MASTER (1996)).
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my favorite cultural icons of the 1950s: Davy Crockett and the
defenders of the Alamo. The new historians now say that
Crockett did not wear a coonskin cap, that he put on a dress
and tried to escape with the women and children in the Alamo,
and that the defenders were actually attempting to hoard sil-
ver and gold from Santa Anna which they stole from the
Apaches whom they had butchered."
Thus, I would not be surprised if Holmes ends up becom-
ing a new kind of multicultural icon. If Davy Crockett was
cross-dressing at the Alamo, then maybe Holmes and James
were more than just literary friends. Who knows for sure? In
thinking about the canonization process, we need to consider
how politics and culture, and in our case, the "politics" of
postmodernism, work to canonize and re-canonize famous dead
people in American history.
The second intellectual project about Holmes concerns the
explanation of the contradictions and tensions within his legal
thought. What should we make of the inconsistent cast to
Holmesian jurisprudence? Is Holmes's most famous legal essay
hopelessly doomed to analytical tension and inconsistency, or
is there a way to read The Path of the Law as a consistent and
coherent jurisprudential text? This is Professor Grey's project,
although both Professors White and Wells have contributions
to make on this point. Nevertheless, I will focus on Professor
Grey's paper.
Professor Grey seems to say that the tensions in Holmes's
The Path are good examples of what one can expect when a
legal pragmatist engages in legal theory. Because legal prag-
matists do not believe in theory, they are not too concerned
with tensions, contradictions or logical coherence. Instead,
legal pragmatists care primarily about the law serving a useful
purpose in getting a job done. Legal pragmatists exhibit what
Professor Grey called "freedom from theory-guilt." Or, as
"' See Allen R. Meyerson, For Defenders of the Alamo, the Assault is Joined
Anew, N.Y. TmES, Mar. 29, 1994, at 1.
"7 See Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side. Wallace Steuens and Pragmatist
Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1990). Professor Grey seems to be
saying in his paper that Holmes's The Path of the Law exhibits good-old American
"freedom from theory-guilt" because Holmes's pragmatism leads him to use whatev-
er works-a little of this, a little of that-to convince us of the importance of
being pragmatic about law.
1997]
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Jack Balkin once put it: "Being a legal pragmatist means never
having to say you have a theory.""8
Professor Grey seems to be saying that in The Path
Holmes was engaged essentially in a marketing strategy de-
signed to overcome a problem of nonexistent consumer de-
mand.' 9 It is akin to the problem that Ford had with the
Edsel-it was ugly, boring, and no one really liked it because
everyone wanted to buy the standard Ford. Indeed, I imagine
that the law students and lawyers from Langdell's Harvard
Law School, listening to Holmes at Boston University in 1897,
must have thought that Holmes had lost sight of the vocational
track for lawyers and judges of his time and was instead trying
to sell a new vocational track or "path."" Holmes's problem in
"' Jack Balkin, The Top Ten Reasons To Be A Legal Pragmatist, 8 CONST.
COMMENTARY 351 (1991).
" Remember, Holmes's The Path was given as a speech to law students, law-
yers and judges at Boston University in 1897. In 1897, Langdell, not Holmes, was
at the center of American jurisprudence. In addressing the future lawyers of his
day, Holmes wanted his audience to see how the prevailing formalism and natu-
ralism of Langdell at Harvard had placed too much emphasis on the imminent
rationality of law. His position was similar to that of an entrepreneur trying to
sell a new product idea to unaccustomed customers.
20 To determine the basis for the formation of a particular rule of law using
Langdell's analysis, one would identify the relevant appellate court decisions re-
sponsible for the rule and, if possible, examine the rule in relation to history. The
rules were thought to develop on the basis of an evolutionary process much like
the development of a plant. In thinking of law as a science, lawyers never ques-
tioned the worth of the rules. As Holmes put it in The Path:
[Alan evolutionist will hesitate to affirm universal validity for his social
ideals, or for the principles which he thinks should be embodied in legis-
lation. He is content if he can prove them best for here and now. He
may be ready to admit that he knows nothing about an absolute best in
the cosmos, and even that he knows next to nothing about a permanent
best for men.
Holmes, The Path, supra note 2, at 468.
While Holmes thought that Langdell made amazing progress in reforming
legal pedagogy at Harvard, he nevertheless thought that there was something
missing- a critical attitude or ethic, or "enlightened skepticism." Holmes, The Path,
supra note 2, at 469. This term referred to the reconsideration of the usefulness
or "worth" of the rules.
Holmes wanted us divert our attention away from abstract moral questions
about "right" and "duty." Holmes's "prediction theory": "The prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law;"
and his theory of the "bad man" became Holmes's guide for emphasizing the im-
portance of analyzing law in terms of consequences. See Richard A. Posner, In.
troduction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES,
JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. at xi
(Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
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The Path was to get consumers who were weaned on
Langdellian formalism to buy an "Edsel--that is, legal prag-
matism. Legal pragmatism, being "a little of this, and a little
of that," is a hard sell when the audience is trained to want
science and logically correct results.
Professor Grey argues that Holmes's strategy in The Path
was to rely upon his great talents as a prose stylist to sell his
pragmatism. Holmes thus used a classic literary narrative to
sugar coat pragmatism so that it would go down with ease. As
Professor Grey tells it, Holmes takes us from sharp de-
scent-law is a practical business, law must be separated from
morality, law must be viewed from the perspective of a bad
person-to the familiar theme of wisdom and salvation-law is
an "echo of the universal." I wonder, however, whether there
are other ways of explaining the meaning of the tensions with-
in Holmes's The Path.
Professors White and Wells offer different views. Professor
White's view is that Holmesian thought is fraught with tension
and contradiction because Holmes was a "transitional figure,"
who had one foot in a premodernist epistemology and the other
in a modernist epistemology. Because Holmes was standing be-
tween two great epistemologies, his work in the law ends up
advancing both, leaving us with the legacy of the tensions and
contradictions posed by two competing theories of knowledge.
The tensions within The Path are thus characterized by White
as the result of Holmes's troubled modernist jurisprudence
rather than his pragmatic philosophy.
Professor Wells, on the other hand, argues that the ten-
sions in Holmes's legal thought must be understood as a conse-
quence of his cynicism and "old-fashioned" postmodern sensi-
bilities about the ability of human beings to reach some ideal
understanding about the law.2' Professor Wells argues that
Holmes's view is that knowledge about law must always be
derived from experience, and that "all there is" is experience.
As stated by Professor Wells in a previously published paper,
"in Holmes'[s] analysis, the relationship of law both to morality
and to power depends upon the standpoint of the person doing
21 See Catharine Pierce Wells, Old.Fashioned Postmodernism and the Legal
Theories of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 63 BROOK. L. REV. 59 (1997).
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the describing."22 According to Professor Wells, Holmes be-
lieved that observational experience, describing what is before
one's eyes, is as close as we ever get to knowing universal
truth.
My view is somewhat different. In thinking about the
tensions in Holmes's essay, it is helpful to consider what
Holmes was trying to do in The Path. Think for a moment
about the title of the essay we celebrate today: The Path of the
Law. Why did Holmes choose to regard law as a "path?" We do
not normally think of law that way; rather, we tend to think of
law as a "constraint" that limits the exercise of power. As my
colleague Steve Winter has recently noted, much of modem
jurisprudence in America has used the metaphor of "con-
straint" to describe the meaning of law.' Conceptual meta-
phors like "constraint" and "path" enable us to think about law
in different ways. The choice of the metaphor tells us some-
thing about the character or ethos of the author. Why did
Holmes encouiage us to think of law as a path? What does the
path metaphor reveal about Holmes, the author?
I think Holmes thought of the law as a path because he
understood that law is a social construction created from the
legal imagination of human beings. As a social construction,
new paths of law can be discovered if we only consider new
imaginative possibilities for the law. Perhaps Holmes was
saying to his audience at Boston University in 1897, "come
with me; join me on my 'path.' " He never really tells us where
his path will take us, except when, as Professor Grey observes,
he cryptically mentions at the end of his essay something
about the "hint of universal law."
I think Holmes hoped that we might someday discover
universal law by adopting his ideal of remaining skeptical
about the powers of logic and reason in the law. Holmes want-
ed us to adopt what Professor Grey calls mainstream pragma-
tism. He wanted us to give up trying to explain the nature of
things, to stop theorizing and philosophizing about the law,
and instead focus our energies on figuring out how law actual-
See Wells Hantzis, supra note 8, at 575.
Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in The Forest, (forthcoming 1998).
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ly works in practice. The tensions within Holmes's legal
thought may be part of the "path" that he hoped would lead us
someday to discover his ideal.
For Holmes, Langdellian formalism, and the blind obedi-
ence to the rules of case law, studied like a "science," constitut-
ed one path in the law. Holmes wanted to show how we might
find another path. To get us on his path, Holmes had to first
break free from the exclusive hold of logic and reason in law.
Thus, he wanted us to focus our effort on the task of under-
standing how the ideals of law develop from experience, not
logic.
I think it is important that Holmes was explicit about the
importance of separating morality from law. He warned us not
to confuse morality with law, or logic with experience. He did
so because he wanted us to develop a skeptical attitude toward
the law that would move us toward his ideal of studying the
law, neither as a science nor as a specialized field of morality,
but rather as a practical business where things get done and
where there are material consequences flowing from judicial
decisions.
In thinking about law in this way, Holmes was swimming
against the prevailing jurisprudential currents of his time.
Holmes acknowledged this, stating: "We still are far from the
point of view which I desire to see reached. No one has reached
it or can reach it as yet."'
Professor Grey and Wells seem to be saying that Holmes's
new ideal was legal pragmatism. But what if Holmes's ideal
was something else? What if Holmes wanted to leave that
question open for future generations to decide? Is it possible
that Holmes imagined that one hundred years later a new
generation of legal thinkers might discover a new path for the
law, leading away from mainstream pragmatism, as well as
modernism, in law? I think Holmes thought that if we followed
his example, we might someday be in a position to realize a
hint of a universal law that had not yet been reached in juris-
prudence. I think that what Professor Grey sees as legal prag-
matism, or "a little of this, a little of that," in The Path may be
critical moments in the development of a new jurisprudential
paths for law.
4 Holmes, The Path, supra note 2, at 468.
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I imagine Holmes wanted us to cultivate many "paths" in
the law. He wanted us to see that we have it in our power to
create a legal order better suited for our time. He wanted us to
see that his "path" was merely one example of what could be
done if we used our imagination. If law is to be considered a
"path," as Holmes suggests, then what is to stop us from using
the law to cultivate new paths leading in many new directions?
This brings us to the third intellectual project on
Holmes-the problem of characterizing Holmes's jurisprudence.
Was Holmes, as Professor White suggested, a "transitional
figure in the development of legal modernism"? Or was he, as
Professor Grey argued, a "mainstream legal pragmatist" who
used his literary talents to peddle his pragmatist philosophy?
Or, as Professor Wells seems to intimate, was Holmes really
one of the first legal cynics in America to advance a
postmodern stance toward the law? These are our choices:
Was he (1) a modernist, (2) a pragmatist, or (3) a classical or
old-fashion postmodernist? Ready to vote on the question?
Maybe not just yet.
In thinking about your answer, I would like to offer a few
thoughts about what was modern and what was postmodern
about Holmes. In acknowledging that law was made, not dis-
covered, Holmes accepted the modernist's view that it is within
the power of human actors to create law. This makes Holmes
"one of the most modernist of modern thinkers."' On the oth-
er hand, Holmes's skepticism points in the direction of
postmodernism.26 The main message of The Path of the Law
2 JOHN PATRICK DIGOINS, THE PROMISE OF PRAGMATISM, 344 (1994). The chal-
lenge of modernism is to figure out what to do once we realize that God is dead
and that the problem of creating meaning is left to men and women. Legal mod-
ernism can be defined as an aesthetic, political, cultural and intellectual movement
based on the lawyer's romance, faith, and yes, obsession, with the idea that we
should able to figure out and explain the essential truths of the world by employ-
ing the correct methodology, narrative, technique, or mindset. Legal modernism is
the project of establishing law's claim to foundational authority.
26 The challenge of postmodernism is to figure out what to do once we have
given up on the modernists' quest for foundational authority in the law.
Postmodernism may be thought of as a "late stage" in the development of modern-
ism-a stage characterized by deep disenchantment with the projects of modernity.
Postmodernists offer us a new message about what we should be doing in law.
The message is that we try to go beyond modernism by taking a more relaxed
look at the law. We should give up on trying to discover the foundations of legal
authority and try instead to either figure out how law actually works in practice,
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is that there is no basis in reason or morality for discovering
legal truth. Lingering doubts about faith and reason seem to
push Holmes in the direction of postmodernism in the lawY
Clearly, Professors Grey and Wells are correct in arguing
that Holmes was influenced by American pragmatist philoso-
phy.' While Professor White is on safe ground in pointing out
how Holmes led us to modernism in law, I think Professor
Wells is also right in suggesting that Holmes's cynicism moved
beyond modernism to postmodernism in law. Yet, I think
Holmes looks postmodern today only because we have the
hindsight of almost one hundred years of modern legal
thought. We are now living in the era of disenchantment; noth-
ing guarantees that we can discover the solution to the current
predicament.
That is to say, when we read Holmes today, we discover
the basis for our deep disagreements and our diversity. Some
want to "overcome" law.' Others want to "redeem" law, to go
back to a "lost tradition."" Still others want to show us how
we can do law without theory.3'
It would seem that Holmes the icon has become a mirror
that we look into only to find ourselves looking back. In look-
ing into the mirror we get a glimpse of our current predica-
ment. For this reason, Holmes's The Path of Law looks as fresh
or we should focus our energies on understanding how beliefs in law get justified.
As John Patrick Diggins has said:
Holmes is almost postmodern in that the doubts and tensions that
troubled thinkers like Adams--tension between knowledge and experience,
events and meaning, truth and change--scarcely concerned Holmes....
Holmes savored life. A natural skeptic, he felt no need to flee the
'irritation of doubt' to arrive at settled beliefs.
JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE PROMISE OF PRAGMATISM, 344 (1994).
' Holmes was a member of the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge in the early
1870s whose membership included Charles Pierce and William James. Thus, he
was likely well versed in the pragmatist philosophy of Pierce and James. In addi-
tion, as Wells indicated, Holmes likely shared the fundamental philosophical out-
look of American pragmatist thinkers like Pierce. See Wells Hantzis, supra note 8,
at 545 (discussing Max Fisch's documentation of the Metaphysical Club in Cam-
bridge).
See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
30 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYERI FAILING IDEALS OF THE LE-
GAL PROFESSION (1993).
", See Grey, supra note 17, at 1569. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROB-
LEIS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454-69 (1990).
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as the day it was given as a speech at Boston University in
1897. Maybe this explains the essay's astonishingly long shelf-
life.
One hundred years have gone by, however, and constitu-
tional revolutions have come and gone. Startling new develop-
ments in jurisprudence have appeared, only to fade, as they
are revealed to be but incomplete and failed attempts to ex-
plain the mysteries of the law. Yet, here we are, still looking
into the mirror that is Holmes, and still wondering where his
"path" leads. Is this not just another illustration of the current
predicament in legal studies-a predicament that some choose
to characterize as postmodern?
What would Holmes think of this? If he were here today,
at this symposium, what would he think about what we are do-
ing? I think he would be amused. Indeed, I imagine that if he
were here now he might invoke his "dragon in cave" metaphor
from The Path of the Law. He used this metaphor to explain
what we should do in approaching law from his ideal of "en-
lightened skepticism." The first thing we would need to do is to
pull a "dragon out of his cave." The next step would require
courage and resolve. For, as Holmes put it in The Path:
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is either
to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.32
I imagine that if Holmes were here today he would be sur-
prised by discovering, ironically, that his legend and his juris-
prudence have become our dragons in the cave.
If he were with us today, I think he would warn us that
we are still in danger of coming under the spell of these new
dragons in the evolution of the conceptual structures of the
law. Holmes would encourage us to pull these new dragons out
of their caves. He would want us to count their teeth and
claws, and to see how powerful they really are in the light of
day. And, Holmes would want us to either tame or kill them,
including the dragon that has become "Holmes, the icon." We
need to do this so that we might go on to do something useful
with our law studies and practices.
32 Holmes, The Path, supra note 2, at 469.
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